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Abstract
This paper investigates an important area in postcolonial studies. It analyzes American politics reflected in both its foreign policies and in literature as a new trend that may be called “American Occidentalism.” The United States replaces Europe and any other power as the sole agent capable of interfering in global affairs. And in this very sense, it becomes the representative of the Occident. All these claims bring salient consequences and threads. Prominent scholars recognize the decisive American role in Occidentalism; they try to highlight the U.S. position in introducing and presenting itself as the representative of Occidental world. In order to investigate all this and probe its characteristics, the paper is going to start with some pioneers who articulate and indicate to this American Occidental phenomenon. Edward Said, Avram Noam Chomsky and others are going to be read accordingly.

1. Introduction
Today the United States occupies an unprecedented position in postcolonial studies. These studies concentrate, among other current issues, on the aftermaths and critiques of the American ideological interventions in global settings. Whilst colonialism witnessed colonialist European countries took the lead in the world’s affair and business, the postcolonial era witnesses the unique emergence of the U.S. as a mono-substitute. Not too long after the end of WWII, a gradual dramatic shift occurred in the international scene resulted from three events: The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and September 11 tragic attacks. This substitution of Eurocentricity with sheer Americancentricity anticipates a new literary trend and global order. With these events, new patterns of postcolonial enterprise coincide; while the colonial era is characterized by parameters of direct military occupations, genocide, suppressions, dominance, and confiscations, the American postcolonial enterprise displays other different hegemonic parameters: long-distance control, economic, and cultural interventions, advanced military strikes, covered by liberalist politicized claims. The U.S. is now the sole power in the international postcolonial scene. Piecemeal a stereotype about the U.S is being drawn and popularized. This stereotype tellingly is the novel Occidental icon that the U.S.
embodies. The United States of America has become the mouthpiece of the West overnight.

2. American Occidentalism Contextualized

The prominent scholars stand as the pioneers in American circle studies and who observe this new Occidental stereotype are Edward Said and Avram Noam Chomsky. They load their analyses and criticisms on the stages and statuses that the American Occidental hegemony reaches and achieves with strident and obvious threads and judgments. Their strikingly innovative projects tackle a number of characteristics: imperialistic hegemony of various forms, dominant Occidental identity, and imposed ideologies. Said and Chomsky then expressively incarnate new Occidentalist whose works sharply contrast with their counterparts Orientalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While classic Orientalists studied, pointed, revealed, and admired the Orient and its charms and secrets, the Occidentalist have been studying, analyzing, and pointing to the atrocities and sinister deeds of the (American) Occident. Second their counterparts were interested in various Oriental regions, places, countries, persons, and incidents, while these Occidentalist deal exclusively with the U.S. Third the Orientalists had sprung from the West and moved to the East accordingly, Said and Chomsky spring also from the West, but by contrast, they turn inwardly rather than outwardly.

The new American Occidentalism overtly diverges from the classic Orientalism. But both Orientalists and Occidentalist share profoundly common merits. They embody Anglophone, Francophone, and other European interests, Western scholarship expressed at least since 1742 till the present, and the late Western legacies. Nevertheless, they depart from each other in two decisive practices: The former praises the Orient, the latter condemns the Occident; the former is in demise, the latter is in its full bloom. The interests pointed to by the Orientalists: archeological and anthropological scientific findings, charms and beauties of the East, nostalgia and yearning for the innocence are drastically no longer there; the Orient now becomes a discipline of specialized books and a field of interests and studies basically in politics. The shift of the study of the Orient from the pens of scientists, scholars, and literary figures to politicians’ and political groups’ justify this claim. If a poet or other literary figure cites or hints at Baghdad or Damascus, for instance, this would nowadays be regarded, if not too ominous, quite ridiculous.

Out of Said’s and Chomsky’s hands emerges one state with unified and constant postcolonial practices and ideologies: The U.S. the burgeoning representative and leader of the Occident. This representative is a dominant, ruling, and exploitative power. It is the
first time in modern human history, at least since the Renaissance, one country rules the world and expresses a quite different range of ideologies. And as such, in Saidian and Chomskyian frameworks the U.S. becomes an empire quite like, say, the Roman Empire. Therefore, the binary of the Orient and the Occident has vanished only in the light that the latter is in its bloom while the former in its decadence. Or to put it in Gyan Prakash’s words:

it is now widely recognized, instituted enduring hierarchies of subjects and knowledges—the colonizer and the colonized, the Occidental and the Oriental, the civilized and the primitive, the scientific and the superstitious, the developed and the underdeveloped. The scholarship in different disciplines has made us all too aware that such dichotomies reduced complex differences and interactions to the binary (self/other) logic of colonial power. But if the colonial rulers enacted their authority by constituting the ‘native’ as their inverse image, then surely the ‘native’ exercised a pressure on the identification of the colonizer. (3)

Let us now turn our attention to each of these pioneers and investigate how the U.S. takes the lead in the cosmopolitan world and becomes the representative of Occidentalism.

3. Edward Said’s Hidden Proclamations

The postcolonial dynamic settings and situations have accelerated and brought into the global scene the emergence of American Occidental phenomenon that is suitable for investigation in the academy. Said (1935-2003) and Chomsky (b.1928) have extensively contributed to the mutation of the postcolonial studies to be an Occident-oriented discipline. But within their peculiar individual projects lurk some distinctive metamorphoses and differences. Said’s approach incarnated in Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism can be read as a historic-cultural and literary-based approach: almost often but not always Said begins a given section, article, etc., with a historical survey, tackles some cultural interpretations, and then pierces into literature. Second, his comments and criticisms are overtly modest and euphemistic; Said is perpetually avoiding too racial, religious, and too harsh imperialistic terms and interpretations. Indeed, he avoids politics as Chomsky avoids literature. Finally, Said moves from politics to culture and eventually to literature. To elaborate this claim further, let us begin with Orientalism. Orientalism (1978) is an ambivalent book for it is shyly tackling what Orientalism has reached and expressed on one hand, and the presence of American roles within it on the other. Although Said argues that “as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have
given it reality and presence in and for the West,” one page later he plainly writes that “I myself believe that Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient” (5, 6). Said in both of these quotations and throughout the book and in other writings diagnoses the situation but does not go any further:

[to say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable. (123).

Said is reluctant and in some ways uncertain of the term itself. In consequence, Orientalism deals with and studies a set of topics, ideologies, and threads that have not much to do with the title; rather they have to do with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. In other words, Said chooses the title but it seems that he means other topics and issues:

enough is being done today in the human sciences to provide the contemporary scholar with insights, methods, and ideas that could dispense with racial, ideological, and imperialistic stereotypes of the sort provided during its historical ascendancy by Orientalism. I consider Orientalism’s failure to have been a human as much as an intellectual one; for in having to take up a position of irreducible opposition to a region of the world it considered alien to its own, Orientalism failed to identify with human experience, failed also to see it as human experience. (328)

Said takes up Orientalism as a subject matter but he deals with the aftermaths of it, that is, the consequences and developments of the field. In this very manner, he concentrates on what may be called “General-Orientalism” for he describes different situations, meanings, and interpretations that Orientalism has apparently departed and consequently lacked. Really the title, “Orientalism” is misleading. Nor does Said specify the American leading roles within Orientalism. He is doing with the topic the opposite: describing and characterizing the aftermaths of Orientalism rather than exactly specifying to where Orientalism now moves. A figure like Edward Said should not be reminded that the “relationship of the United Sates with the Orient,” we are boldly told, “only really began with the Second World War and thus in terms of political and military action. Since that war the military/political factor has been pre-eminent and American orientalism is largely concerned with policies, with data, statistics, trends and commerce” (Cuddon, 664). Oddly, Said mentions something similar to this in his comment on the status that Orientalism reaches in the U.S. after the WWII. The Orient becomes, according to Said, “not a broad catholic issue as it had been for centuries in Europe,
but an administrative one, a matter for policy” (290). Indeed, he touches the heart of the topic however, leaves it at this level.

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said voices the same tone and attitudes on the American enterprise:

> before we can agree on what the American identity is made of, we have to concede that as an immigrant settler-society superimposed on the ruins of considerable native presence, American identity is too varied to be a unitary and homogenous thing; indeed the battle within it is between advocates of a unitary identity and those who see the whole as a complex but not reductively unified one. (xxix)

Then a few lines later, he recalls that “I do not wish to be misunderstood. Despite its extraordinary cultural diversity, the United States is, and will surely remain, a coherent nation.” Said is too general and does not specify and identify the American roles in new forms of its Occidental merits. In other words, Said’s concept and interpretation concerning the American character and its relationship to the Orient is immature. Gita Rajan and Joy Harjo confirm this conclusion in which they see Said’s scope is distorted by his own generalized and too wide picture (6). However, in a later article, Said seems more open and decisive in describing the leading parts played by the U.S. He writes that the United States is no ordinary large country. The United States is the last superpower, an enormously influential, frequently interventionary power nearly everywhere in the world. Citizens and intellectuals of the United States have a particular responsibility for what goes on between the United States and the rest of the world (Prakash 32).

And then he appears to conclude that “[e]ven if we were to allow, as many have, that United States foreign policy is principally altruistic and dedicated to such unimpeachable goals as freedom and democracy, there is considerable room for skepticism” (33). Said’s approach on Orientalism and the American roles within it is really blurred by this perception of “skepticism.” It could be argued that Said’s perspective on the American Occidentalism: domination and intervention lurks somehow far in the early colonial studies. The clear and heavy American presence across the globe exercises postcolonial policies and cosmopolitanism merits; two main points that Said could not widely elaborate. However, we see a prowling imperialistic image of the American Occidentalism gradually appears in Said’s discourse, although it is too shy, faint, and dim.

4. **Avram Noam Chomsky’s Burst**: Chomsky envisions the complete image on American hegemonic Occidentalism. He is
obviously sharp and dysphemistic, direct and diagnostic; he brings about sensitive discussions and notions such as imperialistic, empire, military force, etc., just to characterize the American power. For him politics becomes an American recent doctrine. Chomsky spares no word whatsoever in criticizing and dismantling the political, exploitive American Occidentalist project. The American Occidentalist project takes two chief stages in Chomsky’s framework. The first one begins after the WWII. “While most of our industrial rivals,” Chomsky eloquently elaborates, “were either severely weakened or totally destroyed by the war, the United States benefited enormously from it. Our national territory was never under attack and American production more than tripled” (How 10). Gradually the U.S. starts to penetrate countries that once had been taken by European powers namely, Britain and France. Here a main shift occurs in a world order in general and in the (Arabic) Orient in particular: The U.S. has replaced the Western World as the sole player and doer in the (new) Middle East. And this is a postcolonial fact. The Middle East is “then passing into American hands as we push[ed] out our rivals France and Britain,” to cite Chomsky again (13). From that time on, the U.S. becomes the policeman of the whole region, and it “has been concerned more with control than access” (Hegemony 162). The Gulf is a focal point of attention:

US intelligence expects Gulf energy resources to become even more significant in the years ahead, hence also the drive to maintain control, whether the US itself relies heavily on these resources or not. The global system of military bases from the Pacific to the Azores was designed in considerable measure for operations in the Gulf region. . . . It had long been anticipated that one of Washington goals in Iraq was to obtain military bases right in the heart of the oil-producing regions. (162-03)

The second stage that resoundingly articulates the hegemony of American Occidentalism is the aftermath of the September 11. The invasion of Iraq inaugurates a new turbulent era between the American Occidentalism and the Orient. This stage changes the previous relationships, denotations, and interpretations of the two. Thus, when he is asked about the regional and international implications of the Iraq invasion, Chomsky points that I think not only the region but the world in general correctly perceives the U.S. invasion as a test case, an effort to establish a new norm for the use of military force. This new norm was articulated in general terms by the White House in September 2002 when it announced the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The report proposed a somewhat novel and unusually extreme doctrine on the use of force in the
world, and it’s not accidental that the drumbeat for the war in Iraq coincided with the report’s release. (Imperial 1-2)

Chomsky describes the U.S. policies and manipulations toward the Third World in general and (new) Middle East in particular exactly the opposite of how the Orientalists did with the Oriental characteristic features. “After the invasion of Iraq was declared a success, it was publicly recognized that one motive for the war had been to establish the imperial grand strategy as a new norm” (Hegemony 21). He employs the phrase “the conquest of Iraq” which sounds instructive and denotative (26). The very word “conquest” is connotatively historical; it denotes military, unpleasant meanings and coercion. Barbarians plunder, armies occupy, and empires conquer. This employment, as we will observe, becomes a tradition afterward.

Chomsky puts heavy emphasis on the mass media. He regards the media as a tool at the hands of the American administration for disseminating its Occidental ideologies. “Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state” (Media 20-21).

Again he employs some terminological words of vital importance. He regards the media as a type of a spoon feeding machine employed by “State propaganda,” that influences the multitudes, the “bewildered herd,” and leads eventually to the “manufacture of consent” (Media 13, 14). Within Chomskyian point of view then, the American Occidental media serve a number of agendas: persuasion, manipulation, and hegemony. Accordingly, the multitudes, that is “the herd” must either follow or support the state; the media stand between the state and the herd for “we need something to tame the bewildered herd, and that something is this new revolution in the art of democracy: the manufacture of consent” (Media 18). Although the phrase “the manufacture of consent” is oxymoronic, the notion it conveys is novel. To give an example about how the American administration really “manufacture[s] the consent,” Chomsky cites a live incident:

in September [2002], a propaganda campaign was launched to depict Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat to the United States and to insinuate that he was responsible for the 9-11 atrocities and was planning others. The campaign, timed to the onset of the midterm congressional elections, was highly successful in shifting attitudes. It soon drove American public opinion off the global spectrum and helped the administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the newly announced doctrine of resort to force at will. (Hegemony 3)

This example enforces the claim that the U.S. “pioneer[s] the public relations industry. Its commitment [is] ‘to control the public mind,’ as its leaders put it” (Media 22). And here comes a salient merit of
American Occidentalism. It is basically political; it politicizes its attitudes and even its military institutions toward the Orient in particular and the world in general. This merit is a postcolonial maneuver. Politics becomes the sweeping literature of the time and its zeitgeist. The clearest example is how the U.S. manipulates the international consent and the public opinions on the Iraq war. Most of the Middle East becomes a politicized arena whose players (local, regional, and international), are as many as its problems and dilemmas.

The enmity of American politics is a truism in Chomsky’s writing. Unlike Said, he does not question or voice some doubts about it. Almost all the American foreign interferences starting with the WWI and onward derive from imperialistic and postcolonial policies and ambitions of the American successive administrations. And here comes a pivotal thread that needs some elaborations. Unlike colonial countries, the U.S. did not undergo a transition from colonialization to post-colonialization. Rather, it starts with colonial enterprise of colonizing, confiscating lands and territories, colonializing them and acting as the indigenes simultaneously. Or to put it in other words, “[f]or a better part of the nineteenth century, if not throughout it, the postcolonial phase and the imperial phase coincided, giving rise to essential ambiguities and contradictions in American culture” (Paryz 3). On the other hand, the relationship between the colonized and colonizer sounds irrelevant for the short numbers of native Americans, inclusively the Indians, who have been brutally minimized by the Americans. But if the imposition of the English language, the American constitution, commercial values are concerned and taken into an account, one can say that the colonizer becomes colonized. As Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1998, 211) elaborate this important postcolonial situation; they call such situation “settler colonies” in which settlers constitute a radically distinct majority with regard to the indigenous inhabitants or where they have imposed a dominance through force of arms and political institutions. . . they act as the agent of that power, and their own identity depends in part, at least initially, on retaining their sense of difference from the ‘native’ population. In this sense they are simultaneously both colonized and colonizer. (212)

The most obvious illustration about the politicized Occidentalist doctrine is to be found in Chapter Eight of Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. It deals with the American agenda of post September 11 world, the war against terror. “It is also widely held,” Chomsky deliberately insinuates, “that the term terror is very hard to define” (188). He probes into some official
definitions of the term “terror.” And he launches some inquiries concerning this war. He begins to relate the American military machine practices with the Nazi perspectives (189). Then he concludes that “[a]nother problem with the official definitions of terror is that it follows from them that the U.S. is a leading terrorist state” (189). He goes on to detail the damages that afflict the U.S. reputation and credibility across the globe.

Chomsky basically considers the September 11 tragic attacks and their rapid and turbulent aftermaths as pretexts that the American administration employs. “Those at the center of power,” Chomsky writes, “relentlessly pursue their own agendas, understanding that they can exploit the fears and anguish of the moment” (217). Even before the tragic attacks and at least during the Cold War, the U.S. handles the Middle East as a fighting arena of politics and a marketplace of oil wells countries, in which each country has a price. In Failed States, Chomsky gives evidence and examples about this policy; and he links this policy, or more correctly, contextualizes it with September 11 aftermaths. “Before the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has supported Israel and shown no signs of solidarity and sympathy to the peoples of the region who suffer under the yoke of suppression and cruelty of dictatorships.” The method by which the U.S. handles the Middle East is ironically called by Chomsky “the messianic mission” (166). He is alluding to the democratic sloganeering acts the U.S. employs whenever it talks about the region. But the Middle East’s peoples despise this policy while the American leaders think in the opposite direction as the following report Chomsky cites tells:

[i]t is comforting to attribute the alleged ‘clash’ between Islam and the West to their hatred of our freedom and values, as the president proclaimed after 9-11, or to our curious inability to communicate our true intentions. . . ‘Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather they hate our policies,’ the study concluded, adding that ‘when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy.’ As Muslims see it, the report continues, ‘American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering.’ (202)

Chomsky articulates doubts and suspicions about the Occidental “messianic mission.” But he is not alone in attributing some Christian connotations to the American Occidentalism. It seems that we are witnessing new emerging waves of Occidentals who adopt Said-Chomsky American Occidentalism. Colin Dueck chooses almost a synonymous word for the title of the book, Reluctant Crusaders. He argues that the “Americans have often been ‘crusaders’—crusaders in
the promotion of a more liberal international order. But Americans have also frequently been ‘reluctant’—reluctant to admit the full costs of promoting this liberal international vision” (2). Dueck sees the period following the Cold War prolific in the U.S. military engagements. He calls it “hegemony” exactly as Chomsky does. And like Chomsky, Dueck considers the collapse of the Soviet Union as an inaugurating event for it could “offer the opportunity for a comparably radical reorientation of America’s diplomatic and strategic role in the world” (145). The American Occidentalism is governed by the Machiavellian principle. In other words, these scholars view and review the Occidental engagements in the world’s affair: Conflicts and wars, as obvious and alarming signs of foreign interference and domination. Dueck regards the U.S. hegemonic policy as follows:

first, that the United States is and ought to be the preeminent world power, with significant interests and obligations in every corner of the globe; and second, that the United States has a special responsibility to promote and uphold a liberal international order characterized by free markets and democratic government. (114)

He perpetually repeats the phase, “grand strategy” as an American pragmatic and at the same time idealistic approach. But he finds it quite political, military and ideological. Therefore he concludes that [t]o pursue a global grand strategy without providing the means—military, political, and economic—for it is to invite not only humiliation, but disaster. The United States, together with its allies, can either take up the burden of truly acting on its own international rhetoric, or it can keep the costs and risks of foreign policy to a minimum. It cannot do both. That is the U.S. strategic dilemma. (171)

5. Tariq Ali’s Advent

Another figure who absorbs the incarnation of the Occidental as sheer American is Tariq Ali (b.1943). Like Said in some of his backgrounds (expatriate, and knows some Arabic) and Chomsky in his direct and harsh dysphemistic proclamations, Ali can be regarded as a pioneer Occidentalist. Bitterness, harshness, dysphemism, and narrative characterize Ali’s stylistics:

[w]hen the lies utilized by Bush and his cohorts were publically discredited as no weapons of mass destruction emerged, the propaganda units and their favoured journalists changed their line and argued: ‘Well, perhaps there are no weapons, but we have got rid of a tyrant and brought democracy to Iraq.’ Really? Democracy? Leaving aside the several thousand Iraqi civilians who died and those who are still being killed, all talk of a meaningful democracy has faded. (Bush 210)
Unlike Said but like Chomsky, Ali extends the historical and narrative feature of his writing. In *Bush in Babylon the Recolonisation of Iraq*, Ali sets forth to dismantling the real mask of the U.S. The first part of the title juxtaposes two conflicting but vital proper nouns: “Bush” embodies the head of the hierarchy of the Occident who then denotes and connotes the military power, tyranny, and supremacy. “Bush” means an (American) Occidental occupier. On the other hand, “Babylon” embodies one of the most famous cities of the Orient which also connotes some Biblical connotations and again we hear some religious echoes. Taken together, “Bush in Babylon” apparently hints at imperialistic and hegemonic propositions. Yet the whole title can serve the claim of this paper: Within the framework of postcolonial era, the occupation of Iraq comes as evidence of the American Occidentalism. Moreover, Ali, like Chomsky, seems to be willing to attach some religious flavor to the American Occidentalist approach. He refers to Bush as “a born-again Christian fundamentalist,” a phrase with an obvious religious emphasis.

Fundamentally Ali considers the American Occidentalist doctrine as politic-economic in character and hegemonic in spirit. He argues that the American intervention in Iraq is therefore imperialistic. The war against Iraq is “only partially about oil, leave alone human rights, but [is] essentially a war to assert imperial hegemony” (143). Although he shows some sympathy regarding the citizens and damages, Ali warns of the consequences of the war. “The conquest of Iraq,” Ali bitterly writes, “marks a new phase in the country’s history and an ominous opening for the twenty-first century” (172). Effectively, he employs the word “conquest” that we have already encountered in Chomsky’s writing. Indeed, this employment is accompanied with the word empire by which Ali describes the U.S. Thus, he exaggerates in claiming that “what is new is not the American Empire, but its solitary existence. It is the first time in world history that a single Empire has become hegemonic” (172).

If we carefully turn to what Chomsky and Ali are indicating, we can then arrive at some interesting results. In postcolonial era, the American Occidentalistism dominates almost entirely the classic Orient–Occident relations; it turns the Orient into fallen states of exploitations, confiscations, and mistreatments. It also puts itself the mouthpiece and representative of the West. In consequence, various values, historical and cultural, of Euocentcity have been encapsulated within American Occidentalistism.

Ali’s Occidentalist approach centers around a main concept: The U.S. is an exemplary postcolonial empire. It depends on its military means and interventions to accomplish its imperialistic and hegemonic objectives. “Iraq today is the first country,” Ali argues in
this direction, “where we can begin to study the impact of a twenty-first century colonisation” (216). This very opinion is held wide by many figures. Jürgen Habermas’ argument refers to the same token: 

[for half a century the United Sates could be counted as the pace-maker for progress on this cosmopolitan path. With the war in Iraq, it has not only abandoned this role, it has also given up its role as guarantor of international rights. And its violation of international law sets a disastrous precedent for the superpowers of the future. (Bartholomew 46)

Tariq Ali restates these notions elsewhere. In The Obama Syndrome Surrender at Home, War Abroad, he states that after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. takes absolute charge of the Arab Gulf and neighboring countries, “initially through local potentates and subsequently via military and direct occupation. Democracy never enters the frame” (127). The military dimension of the U.S. determines the shape and merits of the relationship with the “Other.” In other words, when the politicized military involvements and interventions enter the enigmatic Middle East and other parts of the world, misunderstanding, hatred, uneasiness, and victimization emerge. “The history of Empires are bloody,” Ali resumes and rhetorically wonders “[w]hy should the American Empire be any different”? (246)

6. Conclusion

We witness the aftermaths of colonialism and the perpetual emergence of postcolonial consequences from which American Occidentalism burgeons. A group of scholars has revealed this thread: Said, Chomsky, Ali, and some others. They embody what this paper calls the pioneers Occidentalists. In their works, they articulate certain characteristics and facts about this emergence. These scholars discover and then pinpoint some merits of an empire about the American enterprise. But American Occidentalism modernizes certain methods and maneuvers for accomplishing this: the exercise of military powers, politicization of domestic and foreign policies, and the employment of the media. Out of these new parameters emerges a doctrine that enhances the presence and superpower of the Occidental.

The Occident-Orient relationship enters a turning and non-returning phase accordingly. The American Occidentalism enterprise overshadows the scene and at the same time alters this relationship and pushes it into unexpected directions. Its hegemony, imperialism, and politicization become American trends. Or to put it in Huntington’s own words, “America becomes the world. The world becomes America. America remains. Cosmopolitan? Imperial? National? The choices Americans make will shape their future as a nation and the future of the world” (366). Such an opinion mirrors a
sheer American doctrine, but on the other hand, it alarmingly hints at the unbridgeable gap of understanding and judgment between promoting and maintaining a world peace or manipulating and exploiting interventions for other postcolonial purposes and agendas.

Works Cited

Notes:

1 The internationalization of states, the emerging of international laws, and globalization are among the main postcolonial phenomena.

2 As we will see, Tariq Ali employs almost a same vocabulary.

رواد الاستغراب:
أنثائق الاستغراب الأمريكي

يتناول هذا البحث جانب مهم من جوانب الدراسات ما بعد الحقبة الاستعمارية. يحلل هذا البحث السياسة الأمريكية كما هي معروضة في كل من السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية والادب المكتوب حول ذلك. لقد قامت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية باستبدال أوروبا والقوى الأخرى جاعلة من نفسها القوة الوحيدة القادرة على التغلغل والتدخل في المشهد الدولي. وبذلك أصبحت الولايات المتحدة الممثل الوحيد لمغرب. أن كل هذة الآراء تقود بدورها إلى نتائج ومفاهيم مهمة. لقد قام بعض العلماء والمفكرين بمحاولة هذا الدور الأمريكي الحاسم؛ وقد حاولوا أيضا تسليط الضوء على مكانه الولايات المتحدة في تقديم نفسها كممثل للعالم الغربي. ومن أجل سبر هذا كله والوصول إلى نتائج، سيتناول البحث مجموعة من رواد هذه الظاهرة: أдоров سعيد، أفرام نوام جومسكي وآخرون.